

Institute for Cyber Security



Authorization and Trust in the Cloud

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USECSW May 29, 2013

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


Cloud Computing



> Shared infrastructure

- **❖** [\$\$\$] ----> [\$|\$|\$]
- ➤ Multi-Tenancy
 - Virtually dedicated resources



> Drawbacks:

- Data Locked-in
 - Collaborations can only be achieved through desktop.
 - E.g.: open files in Box with GoogleDoc.
- How to collaborate?

Source: http://blog.box.com/2011/06/box-and-google-docs-accelerating-the-cloud-workforce/



Collaborative Access Control



- Centralized Facility
 - Chance for centralized models in distributed systems
- **→** Agility
 - Collaboration and collaborators are temporary
- ➤ Homogeneity
 - Handful of popular brands
- ➤ Out-Sourcing Trust
 - Built-in collaboration spirit

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Market Place



- ➤ Microsoft and IBM: Fine-grained data sharing in SaaS using DB schema
 - Only feasible in DB
- ➤ NASA: RBAC + OpenStack
 - Lacks ability to support collaborations
- ➤ Salesforce (Force.com): SSO + SAML
 - Focus on authentication
 - Heavy management of certificates

Source: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa479086.aspx

http://nebula.nasa.gov/blog/2010/06/03/nebulas-implementation-role-based-access-control-rbac/

http://wiki.developerforce.com/page/Single Sign-On with SAML on Force.com



Literature



> RBAC

- Problem: emantic mismatch
- ❖ CBAC, GB-RBAC, ROBAC
- * Require central authority managing collaborations
- Delegation Models
 - dRBAC and PBDM
 - Lacks agility (which the cloud requires)
- **>** Grids
 - **A** CAS, VOMS, PERMIS
 - Absence of centralized facility and homogeneous architecture (which the cloud has)



Literature (Contd.)




- ➤ Role-based Trust
 - * RT, Traust, RMTN AND RAMARS_TM
 - Calero et al: towards a multi-tenant authorization system for cloud services
 - Implementation layer PoC
 - Open for extensions in trust models
 - Suits the cloud (out-sourcing trust)





Multi-Tenant Authorization as a Service (MT-AaaS)








MTAS Trust Model




- ➤ If A trusts B then B (resource owner) can assign
 - **B**'s permissions to A's roles; and
 - B's roles as junior roles to A's roles.





MTAS








MT-RBAC Trust Model




- > If B (resource owner) trusts A then A can assign
 - **B**'s permissions to A's roles; and
 - B's roles as junior roles to A's roles.





MT-RBAC







Trust Model Comparison



	RT	MTAS	MT-RBAC
trust relation required	A trust B	B trust A	A trust B
trust assigner	A	В	A
authorization assigner	A	A	В
User Assignment (UA)	$U \to A.R$	$U \to A.R$	$\begin{array}{c} B.U \to \\ B.R \cup A.R \end{array}$
Permission Assignment (PA)	$A.P \rightarrow A.R$	$\begin{array}{c} A.P \rightarrow \\ A.R \cup B.R \end{array}$	$B.P \rightarrow B.R$
Role Hierarchy (RH)	$A.R \le B.R$	$A.R \le B.R$	$A.R \le B.R$
require common vocabulary	Yes	No	No
require centralized facility	No	Yes	Yes


A: resource owner

B: resource requester



Finer-grained Trust Models





MT-RBAC0 exposed roles to all trustees



MT-RBAC1 public roles to all trustees



MT-RBAC2 public roles to Dev.OS



MT-RBAC2 public roles to Acc.AF



Constraints



- ➤ Role Cycles: lead to implicit role upgrades in the role hierarchy.
- > SoD: conflict of duties
 - **❖**Tenant-level
 - E.g.: SOX compliance companies may not hire same the same company for both consulting and auditing.
 - **❖** Role-level
 - Across tenants
- ➤ Chinese Wall: conflict of interests among tenants.



Collaboration Admin.



- > Decentralized management
 - Trusters maintain the trust relation
- > Immediately effective when trust changes
 - Automatic revocation of cross-tenant accesses
 - Agility in cloud environments




PROTOTYPE AND EVALUATION



- ➤ Cloud Service
 - CloudStorage: an open source web based cloud storage and sharing system.

- > Authorization Service
 - Centralized PDP
 - Distributed PEP



Authorization as a Service




Evaluation: Performance




>MT-RBAC vs RBAC

- More policy references incur more decision time
- \triangleright MT-RBAC₂ introduces 6.82% overhead in average.



Performance comparison at PDP



File retrieval delay ratio introduced




Evaluation: Scalability





➤ Scalable by either

- Enhancing PDP capability; or
- Increasing PEP amount.



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Concurrent Req. per PEP (number of req. sets)

Different Numbers of PEP



Summary



- > Collaboration needs in the cloud eco-system
- ➤ Novel service model: MT-AaaS
- Proposed formal models
 - **❖**MTAS
 - **❖**MT-RBAC
 - Constraints and administration
- Prototype and evaluation
 - **♦** Performance overhead ≤ 6.82%
 - Scalable in the cloud
- > Trust Model Comparison



Future Work



- ➤ OpenStack Keystone extensions
- ➤ Integrate trust into ABAC: MT-ABAC
- Unified trust framework for the cloud



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- Bo Tang, Ravi Sandhu and Qi Li. Multi-Tenancy Authorization Models for Collaborative Cloud Services. CTS, 2013.
- Bo Tang, Qi Li and Ravi Sandhu. A Multi-Tenant RBAC Model for Collaborative Cloud Services. PST 2013.